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ABSTRACT 
French local Public Transport Authorities consider urban public transport as a 
Public Service with four missions: accessibility to the city (low income 
households), reducing traffic congestion (urban economy), improving central area 
attractiveness (limiting urban sprawl), and limiting environmental damages. But 
the design of networks is often resulting from incremental changes, leading to a 
poor global performance. Trends show a risk of major crisis. Operating costs are 
increasing fast, as fare box revenue is lazing, leading to an increase of the 
operating deficit. Reducing CO2 emissions implies to reconsider the design and 
the level of service to better attract car users. The performance of the service then 
is a key point to increase both patronage and revenue. 
Based on national data on Public Transport Networks (1995-2005), the paper 
presents financial simulation for different strategies and discusses how to stabilise 
public contribution. Two main paths emerge, but have to be applied together: 
improving the productivity through an in-depth study of operating conditions for 
each route, and redesigning the fare structure in a more personalised way to cope 
with the higher car drivers’ willingness to pay. Conditions for such a large 
restructuration mean discussing contractual relations between Transport 
Authorities and operating companies (margin for manoeuvre to optimize 
performance). 
INTRODUCTION 
The revival of urban Public Transport (PT) now relies on the new objectives of a 
sustainable development. As the transport sector remains one of the main sources of 
CO2 emissions, reducing car use – especially in urban areas, leads cities to centre their 
mobility plans on the development of PT supply. As in most European countries, many 
efforts are conducted in France to offer citizens alternatives to car use, while car traffic 
is discouraged through speed limitation, car parking reduction, or even road capacity 
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restrictions. Improving PT supply implies a better quality of service and higher 
frequencies. In the main French cities, new tramway lines were newly implemented, as 
a visible sign of the clear priority given to public transport. 
However, this important effort in investments seems to have a strong financial impact. 
Benefiting from State subsidies, as well as the important resource coming from the 
Transport Tax, local Public Transport Authorities (PTAs) could consider ambitious 
plans. But a lack of clarity and long term view often conducted to favour city-planning 
objectives rather than to try to improve PT modal share. 
 
France is generally presented as one of the countries where the private sector is strongly 
implied for many years (Van de Velde, 2005). However, the global performance of 
public transport networks does not appear as very high. One of the invoked reasons 
comes from a failing process in delegation contracting (Yvrande-Billon, 2007): it is due 
to a small number of operating companies and a strong involvement of local Public 
Transport Authorities in the definition of the supply. Detailed analysis of the ownership 
regime and of the type of contract shows variations in the technical efficiency (Roy & 
Yvrande-Billon, 2007), but these elements seem insufficient to explain the observed 
high operating cost and the important public contribution to finance the transport 
supply. 
The French model holds in itself other elements which can explain its low technical 
efficiency. The hypothesis presented in this paper relies on the importance given to 
public service obligations and on the easy money obtained from the Transport Tax that 
do not encourage Public Transport Authorities to look for a higher productivity. Present 
financial constraints will change the situation, but, following lessons from European 
experience (Pruijmboom & Van de Velde, 2005; Stanley et al., 2007) important savings 
could be obtained by a redefinition of the tactical level management. 
After presenting the French institutional aspects and the specific financing structure, the 
importance of public contribution will be described to explain the reasons of its 
dangerous drift (Part 1). Simulation results will then be presented, focussing on how to 
limit this contribution by the 2015 (Part 2). Conditions for a better equilibrium between 
contributors will finally be discussed in order to favour a ‘sustainable’ financing of 
urban public transport (Part 3). 
The specificity of the French urban public transport financing scheme 
Since the seventies, France introduced progressively a new means of funding urban 
public transport, by the way of a specific Transport Tax (‘Versement Transport’ – VT). 
At first limited to the funding of investment, VT let main cities developing ambitious 
projects, like subways in the 70’s (Lille, Lyon, Marseille) and then tramways in the 80’s 
(Nantes, Grenoble). This tax, decided by local Public Transport Authorities, concerns 
all public and private companies of more than 9 employees, located within the Urban 
Transport Area where the PT network operates. It is a percentage on the total wages of 
the company, which can vary, depending on two parameters: 1) the size of the city and 
2) the existence of ‘right-of-way’ transport system. Progressively, the size limit was 
downed from 300,000 inhabitants in the 70’s to 10,000 now (Table 1). In the same time, 
the revenue from the VT could be used freely by PTAs. 
Although company’s employees can use the PT network to go to work, the VT is not a 
fee companies pay to get a service. Its main justification relies on the indirect benefit 
companies get from the existence of a PT network, which contributes to the reduction of 
traffic congestion. 
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Table 1: Level of Transport Tax 
Rate on total wages 
Cities from 10,000 
to 100,000 
inhabitants 
Cities with more 
than 100,000 
inhabitants 
Cities with ‘Right-
of-way’ transport 
projects 
France 0.55% 1.00% 1.75% +0.05% in case of inter-municipal organisation 
Ile de France 
Region 
Paris + Hauts de 
Seine county 
2.60% 
Seine St Denis & 
Val de Marne 
counties 
1.70% 
Essonne, Yvelines, 
Val d’Oise & Seine 
et Marne counties 
1.40% 
Source: Ministère de l’Ecologie, de l’Energie, du Développement Durable et de la Mer, 
en charge des Technologies vertes et des Négociations sur le climat, 2009, [on line] : 
http://www.transports.equipement.gouv.fr/article.php3?id_article=7342  
 
Recently, the obligation for companies to reimburse 50% of the PT monthly ticket of 
employees using the PT network to go to work, a measure already existing in the Ile de 
France region, was extended by law to all French cities. In parallel, development of 
Company Mobility Plans helped in offering reduced fares for employees. 
 
The counterpart of the creation of the VT was the removal of all State subsidies for 
local Public Transport Authorities (except in the Ile de France region). This can then be 
seen as a kind of decentralisation measure, where local PTAs are fully responsible for 
their local development. In fact, some subsidies still existed up to 2004, for investment 
in right-of-way transport projects (from 15% for subways up to 35% for BRT). Present 
discussions in the ‘Grenelle Environnement’ (a national consultation on sustainable 
development) let think new subsidies could be decided by the government to help cities 
developing their PT network. 
 
Anyway, this dedicated resource was a breath of fresh air for municipalities, but also 
appeared as easy money. It generated an important investment to develop the supply, 
but sometimes with a lack of rigor on the financial consequences of carried out projects. 
Another consequence was to keep fares low, which was a political will for public 
services. 
 
THE DRIFT OF PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION 
Observing the results of the PT supply development on the 1995-2005 period on a 
sample of 103 cities1
 
, shows most ratios are evolving in the wrong direction (Appendix 
1)… Except in the cities of more than 250,000 inhabitants, the average annual increase 
rates of the number of trips are lower than those of the number of vehicle kilometres 
(Table 2). The better results between 2000 and 2005 might be explained by the 
development of new Urban Mobility Plans, which try to reduce car use by constraints 
on parking supply and traffic speed. 
                                                 
1 Data come from the annual national survey on PT networks, done by the State Centre for Transport Studies 
(CERTU), the PT Authorities association (GART) and the PT Operators association (UTP). The author would like to 
thank them for providing these data. The Ile de France region and Paris case is excluded from the present analysis. 
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Table 2: the 1995-2005 evolution of main ratios (average annual increase rates) 
  1995/2000 average annual increase rate   
2000/2005 average 
annual increase rate  
Elasticity 
  
  Vehicles Kilometres Trips 
Vehicles 
Kilometres Trips 
1995/ 
2000 
2000/ 
2005 
> 250,000 inhabitants [22] 1.40% 1.80% 1.80% 2.40% 1.27 1.36 
100 to 250,000 inhabitants [34] 1.80% 0.40% 1.70% 0.50% 0.21 0.29 
< 100,000 inhabitants [47] 1.50% 0.00% 2.30% 0.00% 0.02 0.01 
Total [103 PT networks] 1.60% 1.30% 1.80% 1.80% 0.86 1.00 
 
Analysing more in details the evolution of operating costs and fare box revenue shows 
significant differences depending on the size of the city (Table 3). The load factor 
(number of trips per vehicle kilometre) increase is slightly positive in the biggest cities, 
a fact that can be explained by two factors. First, more important traffic congestion 
could encourage some people to shift to Public Transport, especially when paid parking 
is developed in the city centre. Second, these cities have implemented new metro or 
tramway lines which are more attractive than traditional bus routes. On the contrary, the 
load factor variation is negative in cities lower than 250,000 inhabitants. It comes from 
extension of bus routes to peripheral areas where the density of population is lower. 
 
The PT supply development led to a strong increase in operating expenses. The cost per 
vehicle kilometre rose at an average of 1.9% per year (in real term). It is higher in big 
cities, due to the development of metro and tramway lines, but also due to a lack of 
effort to improve the commercial speed of buses. In parallel, the fare box revenue per 
trip is decreasing in cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants. This phenomenon comes 
from two elements. First, fares did not increase on average (just following inflation). 
Second, the willingness to secure the loyalty of clients led to increase the share of 
monthly tickets; then the increase of PT use often comes from existing clients, which 
does not generate supplementary revenue. 
 
Table 3: the 1995-2005 evolution of main ratios (average annual increase rates) 
  
> 250,000 
inhabitants 
[22] 
100 to 
250,000 
inhabitants  
[34]. 
< 100,000 
inhabitants 
[47] 
Total  
[103 
networks] 
Served population 0.76% 1.28% 1.35% 1.00% 
PT supply (vehicle kilometres per inhabitant.) 0.83% 0.48% 0.52% 0.67% 
Patronage (Trips per inhabitant) 1.34% -0.83% -1.31% 0.56% 
Load factor (Trips per vehicle km) 0.50% -1.31% -1.83% -0.11% 
Covering ratio  
(fare box revenue / operating expenses) -2.35% -3.30% -2.77% -2.59% 
Fare box revenue per trip -0.92% -0.11% 0.78% -0.60% 
Fare box revenue per vehicle km -0.43% -1.42% -1.06% -0.70% 
Operating expenses per trip 1.46% 3.30% 3.64% 2.05% 
Operating expenses per vehicle km 1.97% 1.95% 1.75% 1.94% 
Operating deficit per trip 3.55% 5.42% 5.25% 4.11% 
Operating deficit per vehicle km 4.07% 4.04% 3.33% 4.00% 
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The consequence is a tremendous increase of the operating deficit per vehicle kilometre, 
with a 4.0% average annual increase rate in real term. Such a situation is not 
‘sustainable’ and projections for the next ten years lead to a major financial risk for PT 
Authorities. 
 
Indeed, PT Authorities have also to finance the development of new routes and 
infrastructures, particularly to cope with the new mobility policies aiming at a 
sustainable development. In most French cities the PT Authority, as the owner of 
equipments and rolling stock, has to finance all investments. A simplified PT account 
can be drawn (Table 4). It allows calculating the Total Network Cost (NTC), taking into 
account operating expenses (OPE) and all other expenses for investment, depreciation 
and PTA operating budget (PTE). Available data do not make possible estimating PTE 
in a more disintegrated way, due to several changes in the accounting PT Authorities 
system between 1995 and 2005. Three sources of revenue can be stated: the fare box 
revenue (FBR), the revenue from the Transport Tax (NTT) and the public contribution 
(PUC) needed to cover the difference between NTC and the dedicated revenues. 
 
 
Table 4: Simplified PT account 
Expenses Revenue 
Operating expenses – OPE 
Other expenses (Investment, depreciation, 
PTA operating budget) – PTE 
Fare box revenue – FBR 
Net Transport Tax – NTT  
Public Contribution – PUC 
Network Total Cost – NTC  Network Total Revenue – NTR  
 
The interest of such a simplified account is to estimate the total public contribution 
(PUC). On the 1995-2005 period, PUC increased by an average annual rate of 7.4% in 
real term (Table 5): 
 
Table 5: The 1995-2005 expenses and revenue average annual increase rates 
PT networks  > 250,000 inhabitants 
100 to 
250,000 
inhabitants. 
< 100,000 
inhabitants. Total 
Operating expenses OPE 3.6% 3.8% 3.7% 3.6% 
Other PTA expenses PTE 4.9% 3.2% 4.6% 4.7% 
Fare box revenue FBR 1.2% 0.3% 0.8% 1.0% 
Net Transport Tax NTT 3.8% 4.3% 4.1% 3.9% 
Public contribution PUC 7.8% 5.8% 6.6% 7.4% 
Network Total cost NTC 4.2% 3.6% 3.9% 4.1% 
 
Table 5 shows that other PTA expenses often increased faster than operating ones, 
stating the important effort in investment on the period. The revenue of the Transport 
Tax also rose, but this can be deceptive. As many cities implemented their first tramway 
line during the studied period, they benefited from a Transport Tax rate of 1.75%, 
instead of 1%. Now they have reached this legal maximum rate, the revenue from the 
Transport Tax cannot experience the same increase level anymore. Moreover, as the tax 
is based on the wages of employees, the present economic crisis could even make this 
revenue decrease in the short term… 
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The first conclusion which can be drawn from these statistics highlights the increasing 
gap between expenses (operation but also investment) and revenues. It questions the 
global performance of networks, as the patronage does not increase at the same level 
and the French tradition of low fares obliges PT Authorities to add more money each 
year. The municipalities members of the PT Authorities now begin to be reluctant to 
dedicate more money to transport, preventing them to use it for other public services, 
such as day-nursery, cultural activities or any other social expenses. Some of them 
intend to reduce their contribution and require for cost cutting. 
 
HOW LIMITING THE PUBLIC CONTRIBUTION BY THE 2015 
Statistics are given here by city size categories. This offers the advantage to avoid 
variations due to the local context of each city (such as the opening date of a tramway 
line) on the 1995-2005 period. Then linear adjustments could be considered with good 
correlation coefficients, even if such a simplification can be easily contested. Trying to 
get forecasts on a relatively short term (2015), a simulation model was drawn with the 
objective to test contrasted policies to stabilise the public contribution (PUC). Equations 
will be briefly described before presenting some scenarios for the future. 
A simulation model to test some strategies 
The Public Contribution (PUC) is defined as the difference between the Total Network 
Cost and the dedicated revenues (Fare Box Revenue + Net Transport Tax): 
 
PUC = OPE – FBR + PTE – NTT    (1) 
 
In order to simulate different strategies, eight variables were identified: 
• The Number of Vehicle Kilometres per Inhabitant (NVKI) 
• The Fare Box Revenue per Trip (FBRT); 
• The load factor: Number of Trips per Vehicle Kilometre (NTVK); 
• The Operating Expenses per PT Employee (OPTE); 
• The number of PT Employees per million Vehicle Kilometre (EVKM); 
• The PT Authority‘s other expenses per Vehicle Kilometre (AVKM); 
• The Net Transport Tax per Inhabitant (NTTI) 
• The PT Area Population (PTAP); 
 
Operating Expenses (OPE), Fare Box Revenue (FBR), Other PTA Expenses (PTE) and 
Net Transport Tax (NTT) then can be calculated as: 
 
OPE = PTAP x NVKI x OPTE x EVKM   (2) 
FBR = PTAP x NVKI x FBRT x NTVK   (3) 
PTE = PTAP x NVKI x AVKM    (4) 
NTT = PTAP x NTTI      (5) 
 
Finally, the Public Contribution can be written: 
 
PUC = PTAP x[NVKI x ((OPTE x EVKM – FBRT x NTVK) + AVKM) – NTTI)  (6) 
 
How to improve the financial situation of urban public transport? The French case 7 
The evolution of the eight variables was calibrated on the basis of the trends on the 
1995-2005 period (linear adjustment). Of course, these variables are not fully 
independent: for example, an increase of the number of vehicle kilometres (NVKI) can 
lead to new investments and then influences the Other PTA Expenses (PTE), depending 
on the type of transport system required. Here, the objective is not to build a complete 
financial model, but just to get a simulation tool, in order to estimate the order of 
magnitude of each variable needed to reach pre-determined objectives (back-casting). 
Detailed estimations and parameters are available in (Faivre d’Arcier, 2008). 
 
Then, considering that past trends are still valid for the next ten years, if nothing is done 
to change present policies, a ‘2015 reference scenario’ can be drawn,. Tables 6 and 7 
show the main results. 
 
Table 6: The 2015 reference scenario: financial data 
 
Simulation 
data 
Operating 
Expenses 
Other 
PTA 
Expenses 
Network 
Total 
Cost 
Fare 
Box 
Revenue 
Operating 
Deficit 
Net 
Transport 
Tax 
Public 
Contribution 
 
Thousand 
€ 2005 OPE PTE NTC FBR OPD NTT PUC 
> 250,000 
inhabitants 
1995 1,201 1,023 2,224 688 513 1,031 506 
2005 1,725 1,652 3,377 799 926 1,534 1,044 
2015 2,400 2,439 4,839 907 1,492 2,098 1,834 
                 
100-
250,000 
inhabitants 
1995 453 166 619 161 291 294 163 
2005 639 268 906 158 480 448 300 
2015 872 395 1,267 150 723 629 489 
                 
< 100,000 
inhabitants 
1995 117 51 168 40 77 83 45 
2005 166 77 242 42 124 122 79 
2015 228 109 337 41 188 169 127 
                 
Total [103 
networks] 
1995 1,771 1,240 3,011 889 881 1,408 714 
2005 2,530 1,997 4,525 999 1,530 2,104 1,423 
2015 3,500 2,943 6,443 1,098 2,403 2,896 2,450 
 
Table 7: The 2015 reference scenario: average increase rates 
2015/2005 
variation 
Operating 
Expenses 
Other PTA 
Expenses 
Network 
Total Cost 
Fare Box 
Revenue 
Operating 
Deficit 
Net 
Transport 
Tax 
Public 
Contribution 
> 250,000 
inhabitants 39% 48% 43% 14% 61% 37% 76% 
100-250,000 
inhabitants 36% 47% 40% -5% 51% 40% 63% 
< 100,000 
inhabitants 37% 42% 39% -2% 52% 39% 61% 
Total [103 
networks] 38% 47% 42% 10% 57% 38% 72% 
 
The reference scenario shows some differences according to the size of the cities. The 
main one concerns the fare box revenue which is decreasing in the smaller cities. This is 
coherent with the trend observed on the 1995-2005 period. In every case, the Other PTA 
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Expenses are growing faster than the Operating Expenses, due to an effort in 
investment, leading to a heavy burden in depreciation for PTA. Even if the revenue 
from the Transport Tax is still important, the low level of fare box revenue leads to a 
higher deficit, and then to an explosion of the Public Contribution. It also can be 
observed that the financial stakes mainly concern cities of more than 250,000 
inhabitants (75% of the sample’s Total Network Cost in 2015). 
 
Table 8: The 2015 reference scenario: average Public Contribution per inhabitant 
€ 2005 2005 
2015 
Reference 
scenario 
Variation 
> 250,000 inhabitants 97.53 € 159.74 € 64% 
100 to 250,000 inhabitants 51.24 € 74.55 € 45% 
< 100,000 inhabitants 28.98 € 41.84 € 44% 
 
The main worrying question for local PTAs is the increase of the Public Contribution 
per inhabitant (Table 8), as this generally implies to increase local taxes. However, in 
the present situation, such a growth becomes impossible. As already mentioned, 
municipalities will not easily accept to reduce other public expenses to finance public 
transport more. Looking for new resources is of course the first considered solution. 
Resorting to loans is already used for financing new transport infrastructure, but will 
generate future recurrent burden. Road pricing is not politically acceptable now in 
France, even if paid parking was strongly developed these last years. Increasing the 
Transport Tax would induce growing labour cost for companies and results in a loss of 
competitiveness.  
Then four options remains: 1) looking for new contributors (land value recovery, car 
users contribution); 2) increasing the Fare Box Revenue (presently covering a little 
more than 20% of the Total Network Cost; 3) reducing the Total Network Cost; or 4) 
improving the PT network performance… 
Some scenarios to stabilise the Public Contribution 
The simulation tool can help to estimate the possible impact of different strategies to 
stabilise the Public Contribution. Here the objective is not to design detailed actions, but 
to measure the importance of efforts needed to improve the financial situation of PT 
networks. It is a means to explain PTAs that the streamlining they wish cannot be 
obtained through soft measures, and will request structural changes in PT policies. Four 
scenarios were tested. In order to avoid a too long discussion, results will be limited 
here to networks of cities with more than 250,000 inhabitants 
 
The main goal of the first scenario aims at reducing the 2015 Public Contribution to its 
2005 level. According to the simulation tool, reaching this objective makes necessary to 
achieve simultaneously (in comparison with the 2015 reference scenario): 
 
● A 10% reduction of the operating expenses per PT employee (OPTE) 
● A 10% reduction of the number of employees per million vehicle kilometre (EVKM) 
● A 20% increase of the Fare Box Revenue per Trip (FBRT) 
● A 20% increase of the Number of Trips per Vehicle Kilometre (NTVK) 
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All other variables are supposed to follow variations identical to those of the reference 
scenario. A comparison with the trends observed on the 1995-2005 period, clearly 
confirms that such hypotheses require structural changes (Table 9). 
 
Table 9: Scenario 1 – Hypotheses 
22 networks with 
more than 250,000 
inhabitants 
(simulation data) 
2005 
value 
Reference 
scenario 
(2015) 
Scenario 1 
(2015) Variation 
2015/2005 
Annual 
increase rate 
(Scenario 1) 
2005/1995 
Annual 
increase 
rate 
Operating Expenses 
per PT Employee 
(OPTE) 
62,204 € 66,295 € 59,665 € -10% -0.4% 0.7% 
Number of 
Employees per 
million Vehicle 
Kilometre (EVKM) 
83 93 84 -10% 0.1% 1.3% 
Fare Box Revenue 
per Trip (FBRT) 0.60 € 0.55 € 0.66 € 20% 1.0% -0.8% 
Number of Trips per 
Vehicle Kilometre 
(NTVK) 
4.01 4.26 5.12 20% 2.5% 0.7% 
 
Table 10: Scenario 1 – Results 
(Thousands € 2005) 2005 
2015 
Reference 
scenario 
2015  
scenario 1 Variation 
2015/2005 
Variation 
Operating Expenses 1,725 2,400 1,944 -19% 13% 
Other PTA Expenses 1,652 2,439 2,439 0% 48% 
Network Total Cost 3,377 4,839 4,383 -9% 30% 
Fare Box Revenue 799 907 1,307 44% 64% 
Operating Deficit 926 1,492 637 -57% -31% 
Net Transport Tax 1,534 2,098 2,098 0% 37% 
Public Contribution 1,044 1,834 978 -47% -6% 
 
As the rhythm of investment is not changed in this scenario, the increase of the Total 
Network Cost is mainly due to the other PTA expenses. The reduction of the operating 
deficit comes from the strong increase of the Fare Box Revenue. 
 
Presented at the PTAs Association (GART), this scenario was perceived as totally 
unrealistic, but led to an interesting discussion about the strong inertia of the different 
components of PT expenses and resources. It let the local representatives becoming 
aware of the need of deep reforms in the PT governance. 
 
The second and third scenarios have less ambitious objectives. For scenario 2 (S2), the 
objective is to stabilise the ‘Fare Box Revenue / Operating Expenses’ ratio at the 2005 
level (Table 11). Priority is given to a reduction of the Operating Expenses, by 
stabilising the Operating Expenses per PT Employee (OPTE) and the number of PT 
Employees per million Vehicle Kilometres (EVKM) at their 2005 level. This means a 
6% reduction for OPTE compared to the reference scenario and an 11% reduction for 
EVKM. This appears insufficient to reach the objective. A 2% increase of the Number 
of Trips per Vehicle Kilometre, or a 2% increase of the Fare Box Revenue per Trip, is 
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also needed. But this scenario leads to a 36% increase of the Public Contribution 
compared with 2005 (or a 23% reduction compared to the reference situation). 
 
Table 11: Scenarios 2 and 3 – Objectives 
   Objective (2005 value) 
2015 
Reference 
scenario 
Scenario 2 Fare Box Revenue / Operating Expenses FBR/OPE 46.3% 37.8% 
Scenario 3 Public Contribution / Total Network Cost PUC/NTC 30.9% 37.9% 
 
For its part, Scenario 3’s objective (S3) is to stabilise the share of Public Contribution 
in the total of resources. It put a slant on looking for new resources, as the conditions of 
production are supposed unchanged. In the case of cities with more than 250,000 
inhabitants, taken here as an illustration, stabilising the share of the Public Contribution 
means finding extra 337 M€ (or 29 € per inhabitant), while this Public Contribution 
grew by 450 M€ compared with 2005. The scenario suggests sharing equally the effort 
between three variables: the Transport Tax (+5% compared with the reference 
scenario), the Fare Box Revenue per Trip (+12%) and the number of Trips per Vehicle 
Kilometre (+12%). Increasing resources from the Transport Tax seems unrealistic for 
reasons already tackled about the reference scenario. First, the law would have to be 
modified, whatever to increase the rate or to decrease the number of employees from 9 
to 5, for example. Second, as already mentioned, the companies’ economic situation 
could be penalised by the correlative increase of labour cost. Increasing fares should be 
necessary, as the users’ contribution remains low in France, but municipalities are still 
afraid of the political consequences. In such a context, increasing the load factor may 
appear as a solution, but restructuring the PT networks will be necessary to make them 
more attractive. 
 
The fourth scenario replies to a request from the PTAs Association, in relation to the 
objective of a sustainable mobility, nationally expressed in terms of a 20% reduction of 
CO2 emissions by 2020. It means a strong reduction in car use for daily trips. Such a 
transfer from car to PT was estimated as a 60% increase of the number of trips on PT 
networks. The design of the scenario then is quite complex, as several actions can be 
considered. Table 12 presents the chosen hypotheses. 
 
Table 12: Scenario 4 (Sustainable Mobility) – Hypotheses 
Scenario 4: Sustainable Mobility 
(> 250,000 inhabitants) 
Number of 
Vehicle 
Kilometre per 
Inhabitant 
(NVKI) 
Number of 
Trips per 
Vehicle 
Kilometre 
(NTVK) 
PTA‘s other 
expenses per 
Vehicle 
Kilometre 
(AVKM) 
Fare Box 
Revenue per 
Trip 
 
(FBRT) 
Increase rate compared with 2005 25% 30% 30% 25% 
 
These mix an increase of PT supply with an improvement of its attractiveness, in spite 
of fare growth. It appears very hard to design realistic features, because the 20% 
reduction of CO2 emissions should be accompanied by measures dissuading car use 
such as urban car traffic restrictions, oil price increase… Citizens’ environmental 
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sensitivity is also supposed to become higher and to lead to a greater use of alternative 
modes of transport. Of course, these hypotheses can easily be contested, but the goal of 
this scenario is only to demonstrate that efforts for a better management of PT networks 
could lead to satisfactory results, without a Public Contribution explosion, compared 
with the reference scenario (Table 13). 
 
Table 13: Scenario 4 (Sustainable Mobility) – Results 
(Thousands € 2005) 2005 
2015 
Reference 
scenario 
2015 
Scenario 4 
Scenario 
/Reference 
Variation 
2015/2005 
Variation 
Operating Expenses 1,725 2,400 2,772 16% 61% 
Other PTA Expenses 1,652 2,439 2,878 18% 74% 
Network Total Cost 3,377 4,839 5,650 17% 67% 
Fare Box Revenue 799 907 1,740 92% 118% 
Operating Deficit 926 1,492 1,032 -31% 11% 
Net Transport Tax 1,534 2,098 2,098 0% 37% 
Public Contribution 1,044 1,834 1,812 -1% 74% 
 
These four scenarios are only examples of the possible future financial situation of 
French PT networks. Many others hypotheses can be simulated, some might be more 
realistic. The described scenario’s main advantage was to quantify options and to show 
PTAs the necessity to think differently about PT management. As the present economic 
crisis encourages them to a more strict control on public expenses, opportunities for 
reforms appear. Looking for new resources has been studied since many years in France 
and official suggestions made (Philip & Gauthier, 2003; Commissariat Général du Plan, 
2003; Orfeuil, 2005; Pitaval, 2006). But it clearly appears that improving the financial 
equation of public transport means acting for its better economic performance. 
 
IMPROVING THE PT NETWORKS PERFORMANCE 
In spite of the efforts conducted by PTAs to develop their public transport networks 
between 1995 and 2005, results are disappointing in terms of patronage. Several reasons 
can explain this situation: 
 
• Except for cities of more than 250,000 inhabitants, traffic congestion 
remains low and concentrated in the city centre during peak hours. Therefore 
car use is still well performing and faster than PT, which clients remain 
mainly ‘captive’ ones (i.e. people without access to a car). At the end of the 
90’s, new Urban Mobility Plans (‘Plans de Déplacements Urbains’ – PDU) 
started to be implemented with strong objectives of car use reduction. Real 
impacts took several years to be observed, but in the biggest cities (Lyon, 
Lille), travel surveys conducted in 2005-06 show a small but promising 
reduction of the share of car trips. This was reinforced in 2007-08 by the 
high level of oil price, and recent statistics show a significant increase in PT 
use (UTP, 2008): on a sample of 102 networks, the number of vehicle 
kilometre increased by 2.3% in 2007, while the number of trips increased by 
5.9%.  
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• Number of customers is measured in France by the number of ‘travels’. This 
can overrate the importance of PT use for two reasons. First, the number of 
passenger kilometres is never measured, meaning that short and long trips 
have the same weight. Long trips are made mainly by cars (commuters), a 
fact which is not in favour of reducing CO2 emissions. Second, a trip by PT 
including a transfer from bus to tramway, accounts for two travels. This 
statistic bias is even more important because, when developing new tramway 
lines, the bus network is restructured to encourage such transfers. Therefore 
travels are artificially multiplied, although this increase in number does not 
mean new customers, or additional fare box revenue2
 
. 
• The users’ contribution remains low. This comes from the traditional vision 
PTAs have of what a ‘Public Service’ should be, i.e. mainly designed for low 
income people. Local representatives request that each district should be 
served, but as the number of possible clients is low, PTAs tend to implement 
a minimal service, making it poorly attractive. So a great number of vehicle 
kilometres are produced in low density or peripheral areas with weak results. 
But now, the objective is to attract car users, which means developing high 
quality and level of service to compete with car. Moreover, car users have a 
higher willingness to pay (as revealed by the use of their car) as long as they 
can enjoy travel time reduction, reliability and comfort, elements they are 
sensitive to. 
 
• In the French system, PTAs have most of the responsibilities. They define 
services in details (first and last departure, frequency…), they decide the 
level of fares, and they own the rolling stock and infrastructures. It is why 
the call for tender for the delegation contract is a huge document, giving 
little freedom for operators to improve the operation of the network. 
Surprisingly, the size and skill of PTA staff are limited, and relations with 
operators are characterised by a lack of trust, making cooperation difficult. 
Often, the PTA defines standards (such as a 10 minutes frequency in peak 
hour for all routes) without taking into account the operating speed and the 
duration of a return trip: then the bus fleet can be oversized, and the waiting 
time of bus drivers at the terminus can represent more than 20% of the paid 
hours… 
 
All these elements explain the low fare box revenue and the high operation costs. 
Global restructuration of the network is rarely considered, even when new tramway 
lines are implemented. Moreover, no real optimisation processes are decided. PTAs 
generally consider optimisation of the operation is under the responsibility of transport 
operators. But as often strong financial incentives are not planned in the delegation 
contract, the remuneration of operators is mainly linked with the turnover, and 
mobilising a great number of buses and drivers will increase it. 
 
Three main issues can be considered to improve the performance of PT networks: 
reforming the delegation contract to give more responsibilities to operators; developing 
performance measuring at each route level; better identifying the ‘missions’ of PT 
network and their respective costs. 
                                                 
2 Except in the Paris region, where distance-based tariff exists to some extent, transfers within PT networks are free. 
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In theory, the Net Cost Contract3
 
 should encourage operators to a better management of 
operation, through sharing industrial and commercial risks. But the willingness of PTAs 
to keep the control on the Tactical Level has led to a too normative definition of the 
level of supply. Standards should be flexible in relation to the conditions of operation, 
and adapted to the type of clients the network wants to attract. This means a deep 
change of PTAs mentality would be needed in terms of network governance. More 
trustee relations with operators should be established and based on clear performance 
indicators, as well as a new share of responsibilities. As the delegation contract 
authorises a negotiation phase on the bids, this could allow proposals of modification of 
the technical specifications (with respect to the global economy of the contract). 
Diagnostics on the performance of each component of the network should be developed. 
This could lead to get a thinner image of the contribution of each route to the PT 
network utilisation. Such a research is in progress on the Lyon PT network and will be 
extended to other cities. Its objective is to put into relation both the assented level of 
service (and its cost) and the level of patronage, taking into account the contribution of 
the route to feeding the network (transfers) and its assumed ‘missions’. Indicators such 
as the number of passengers per kilometre per period (peak/off peak) can be interesting 
to measure the degree of attractiveness of the supply, and will help looking for a better 
performance of each route. The example of the Berlin PT network restructuration 
(Reinhold, 2008) shows cost cutting and patronage increase can be obtained together. 
 
A better identification of the ‘missions’ of the PT network could also help at two levels. 
First, adapting the standards of the level of service to the public policy goals can lead to 
a better definition of the conditions of a satisfactory attractiveness, with regards to the 
characteristics of the targeted clients. This will probably make it necessary to diversify 
the standards of service, because, as briefly mentioned present car users will request 
reduced travel time, higher reliability, higher frequency for off peak period, but they 
will be ready to pay twice the price to get such a quality. Nevertheless, this will induce 
difficult discussions to convince local representatives that a diversified level of service 
can be more efficient than the territorial fairness they generally promote. Second, a clear 
identification of the missions can help to estimate the additional costs and benefits they 
generate. Then, financing these costs can lead to pricing measures focussed on specific 
payers. For example, the lack of revenue due to fare reductions for low income people is 
a ‘social expense’ which can be attributed to municipal social budgets. But developing 
such an approach needs to design robust methodologies to help building consensus 
within local representatives. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The present financial structure of French PT networks seems reaching a deadlock. 
While the Transport Tax makes many other countries jealous, this source of revenue can 
also generate negative side effects. On a long period, statistics clearly show it 
contributed to a significant supply increase, but also operating expenses drift, while 
fares were kept at a low level without catching new passengers. Such easy money did 
not encourage PTAs to implement coherent mobility strategies or to develop 
                                                 
3 In 2007, 54% of the French networks have Net Cost Contracts (GART, 2008) 
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optimisation processes to stabilise operating costs. Now that public money becomes 
scarce, and that sustainable development objectives strongly encourage to reducing car 
use in cities, new strategies should be developed. Cost cutting will be needed, and this 
constrains to think PT networks structure differently. Searching for a better performance 
is the present new keyword, even if most PTAs have not a clear idea of what it will 
imply in the PT network governance. One of the main lessons from the past twenty 
years is that it is not sufficient to develop high quality networks to attract car users. 
Restrictions on car use should be implemented, and the new French Carbon Tax decided 
this summer (+0.07 € per litre) will probably be insufficient to encourage a significant 
car traffic reduction. 
 
Performance management appears to be unavoidable to look for a greater efficiency in 
PT network design and operation. But fare structure should also be reconsidered, taking 
into account the fact new targeted customers are car users having a higher willingness to 
pay, and being more demanding high levels of service. 
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APPENDIX 1: : THE 1995-2005 EVOLUTION OF FRENCH PT NETWORKS 
Figure 1: Evolution of PT supply per inhabitant 
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Figure 2: Evolution of the number of trips per inhabitant 
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Figure 3: Evolution of the number of trips per vehicle-kilometre 
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Figure 4: Evolution of the fare box revenue / operating expenses ratio 
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Figure 5: Evolution of the fare box revenue per trip 
Farebox revenue per trip
0.40
0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
0.56
0.58
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Data : UTP - chiffres clés 2006
Euros 2005
> 250,000 inhab. [22] 100-250,000 inhab. [34] < 100,000 inhab. [47] Total [103 PT networks]
0,46
0,44
0,46
0,47
+ 0.8 %
- 0.1 %
- 0.6 %
- 0.9 %
 
 
Figure 6: Evolution of the fare box revenue per vehicle-kilometre 
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Figure 7: Evolution of the operating cost per trip 
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Figure 8: Evolution of the operating cost per vehicle kilometre 
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Figure 9: Evolution of the total network cost – main cities 
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Figure 10: Evolution of the structure of financing – main cities 
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